Maule Region, Chile 8.8 Earthquake
Social Science/Urban Planning & Recovery
Policy Group, EERI Team,
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GOVERNANCE
ECONOMIC
PHYSICAL
SOCIAL
COMMUNICATIONS
GOVERNANCE

• Strong central government system, and weaker municipal governments (except Santiago)
• No local requirements to include risk assessment as part of the urban planning system.
• Army acted well in bringing stability and security to towns.
ECONOMIC

• All privatized utilities (electric, water, etc.) are covered by insurance.
• Fishing industry from Concepcion to Constitution hard hit and waters contaminated.
• Small businesses in tourist areas hard hit and will have difficulty recovering.
• National government has adequate sources of funds for recovery and reconstruction efforts.
SOCIAL

• A Social housing organization (Un Techopara Chile, Catholic Church supported) a key player in providing temporary housing.
• Death counts vary from 342 (government) to 480 (PAHO).
• Displaced families living in small temporary settlements or small camp areas near previous homes
• Disaster revealed some fragile aspects of the Chilean disaster response system.
• Many poor and working class people remain in need of assistance.
• Neighborhood and homeowner associations are organized and active.
• Humanitarian support organizations provided quick and effective assistance
PHYSICAL

• Water system supply problems only in Bio Bio region (50% service) after 3 weeks
• Heaviest destruction due to tsunami (maremoto)
• Estimated 75,000 temporary shelter unit to be provided through government funds for tents and Techopara Chile for shelters
• National construction law provides for 10 years of liability for structural defects (in effect after 5/2005)
• Historic buildings of adobe construction heavily damaged
• Few modern code constructed buildings failed
• Valdivia 1960 earthquake killed 3,000+, Maule 2010 less than 500
• High Schools in Bio Bior region received heavy damage
COMMUNICATIONS

• Early difficulties with cell phone services, need to strengthen system
• Importance of local commercial radio stations (such as Talca’s Radio Paloma) in providing initial post-disaster public communication and in mobilizing assistance and coordinating its distribution
• Improved coordination and communication systems between the Hydrology and Oceanographic Institute (SHOA) and the Ministry of the Interior (ONEMI) needed.
Municipal curfew map (rose and darker) illustrates the concentration of impact in the southern central area. Four regions are impacted.
1. CAUPOLICAN 518
2. LOS CARRERAS 1535
3. SALAS 1343
4. TORRE AO’HIGGINS 241
5. LINCOYAN 440
6. FREIRE 1165
7. ROZAS 1145
8. PADRE HURTADO

1. ANGOL 482 A.I.E.P.
2. ANGOL 599
3. ANIBAL PINTO 685
4. ANIBAL PINTO 817
5. BARROS ARANA 1037
6. BARROS ARANA 289
7. BARROS ARANA 314
8. BARROS ARANA 741
9. BARROS ARANA 780-790
10. BARROS ARANA ESQ. ANGOL INS. SANTO TOMAS
11. CASTELLON 1333
12. CASTELLON 1367
13. CASTELLON 152
14. CHACABUCO 155
15. COLO-COLO 1372
16. COLO-COLO 1334
17. COSTANERA ANDALIEN SUR 221
18. DESIDERIO SANTUZA 659
19. EDIFICIO INTENDENCIA –SECTOR ESTACION
20. FACULTAD DE ODONTOLOGIA –UDEC
21. FREIRE 1032
22. FREIRE 1627
23. FREIRE 348
24. FREIRE ESQ. SERRANO Colegio Madres Dominicas
25. HALL VIRGINIO GOMEZ, ESQUINA PRAT
26. IGLESIA SAN JOSÉ , SAN MARTIN ESQ. LINCOYAN
27. INSTITUTO PADRE HURTADO
28. LINCOYAN 334
29. LINCOYAN 554 RESTAURANT MURALLA CHINA
30. LOS CARRERA 2114
31. MAIPU 537
32. MAIPU 573
33. MAIPU ESQ. PRAT-EDIFICIO PAZ
34. O’HIGGINS 340, HOTEL TERRANO
35. O’HIGGINS ESQ. A. PINTO BANCO EDWARD CITY
36. O'HIGGINS ESQ. CAUPOLICAN
37. OROMPELLO 555-559
38. PEDRO DE VALDIVIA 1653
39. PRAT-PLAZA ESPAÑA HOTEL CECIL
40. PRIETO 775
41. RESIDENCIAL CENTRAL, RENGO 659-669
42. ROOSEVELT 1703
43. SAGRARIO COSTADO CATEDRAL
44. SALAS 445
45. SALAS 583-573
46. SUPERMERCADO CAMPODONICO
47. TEMPLE ADVENTISTA, ANGOL 445
48. TUCAPEL 606
GOBIERNO DE CHILE
OFICINA NACIONAL DE EMERGENCIA
MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR - ONEM!